The concept of the external national homeland was brought to the center of postcommunist ethnic studies by Rogers Brubaker.[2] Although other scholars have picked up the idea that the Russian Federation is the homeland for the near-broad Russians, they have failed to examine whether ethnic Russian minorities actually consider Russia to be their homeland and how uniform these Russians are in their views.[3] The answer to this question has important implications for the ability of Russia to mobilize the near-abroad Russians, the support of these Russians for the government, regime, and independence of their state of residence, and the decision by Russians remaining in the near abroad about whether to migrate to the Russian Federation.

Do Russians outside Russia see Russia as their homeland? Do they want Russia to defend their interests? How united are they in their views? What explains variation in responses to these questions at the individual level? This article examines these questions through the analysis of survey data from four post-Soviet states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Ukraine—as well as focus-group data from Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The surveys in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus were conducted in the spring and summer of 1998; the survey in Ukraine was administered in late fall 1998.[4]

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the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame* (London: Sage Publications, 1997); David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Edwin Poppe and Louk Hagendoorn, "Types of Identification among Russians in the Near Abroad," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53 (January 2001).

[2] Rogers Brubaker, "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe," *Daedalus* 124 (Winter–Spring 1995); Brubaker (fn. 1).

[3] Smith and Wilson consider the possibility that many ethnic Russians outside Russia would consider their state of residence to be their homeland, something that our analysis indicates is quite prevalent; see Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, "Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49 (July 1997).

[4] Technical note on surveys: The surveys in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan were directed by Dr. Polina Kozyreva of the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences. The data from Ukraine are based on a block of questions in the Ukraine Fall 1998 Omnibus Survey conducted by Dr. Volodymyr Paniotto of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. The samples in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan were designed as representative samples of Russian speakers in those countries. While most of the respondents were self-identified as Russians, many belonged to other nationalities. In Ukraine the sample was a nationally representative sample, of which Russian speakers (and specifically Russians) were only a randomly selected part. The numbers of respondents and Russians (given in parentheses) in the four surveys are Belarus 803 (765), Kazakhstan 798 (619), Kyrgyzstan 800 (685), and Ukraine 1,600 (329). The interviews were conducted face-to-face, and in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan almost all were conducted in Russian. In Ukraine the interviews were conducted in Russian or Ukrainian, according to the respondent's wishes. There was very little item nonresponse in the survey. For this reason, for the sake of completeness of the interpretation, in much of the tabular analysis we include those who responded "difficult to say" ("don't know") or who did not answer the question (NA or refused) in the reported percentage distributions; however, ex-

These cases provide the advantages of both a "most similar" and a "most different" comparative approach. As post-Soviet states with significant ethnic Russian populations, they share many important features. As a result, any variation in homeland attitudes among these states poses an interesting puzzle. Nevertheless, the four states also constitute two distinct pairs: Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan and Belarus/Ukraine. The first two are Central Asian states in which there is significant cultural distance between majority and minority ethnic groups. The latter two are Eastern European states in which the majority groups share an overarching Slavic identity with ethnic Russians. Thus, one can fairly generalize findings that hold across all four of these states, at least to the remaining states of Eurasia.[5]

The analysis of this article focuses on ethnic Russian respondents to these surveys. The samples were large enough to allow both a reliable representation of the views of ethnic Russians on these questions and an individual-level statistical analysis of the factors that influence the views of the members of the Russian minorities. These data call into question the assumption of a strong bond between near-abroad Russians and the Russian Federation. More important, they challenge the way the concept of homeland is understood by scholars of ethnicity and nationalism in the postcommunist states.

The Concept of "Homeland"

Homelands: External, Internal, Mixed, and State of Residence

While national identity may or may not be based on ethnicity, it always contains a territorial component. An ethnic group becomes "national" when it recognizes a particular territory as one that it has a right to control politically. The development of a sense of homeland and an emotional attachment to that homeland coincides with the development of national self-consciousness. Scholars have asserted that "for a nation to exist, it must have some place that it can claim as its own"[6] and "nations

cluding such responses would not have appreciably changed our interpretations. The focus groups in

cannot be conceived without a specific territory or homeland."[7] Thus, to understand a particular group's idea of homeland one must understand its political and social conduct and its relations with a national "other."

An individual or group can have several possible homelands. The first is an *external* homeland, in which case a minority does not consider any part of its state of residence to be its homeland but instead views some region or state outside its country of residence as the group's true homeland. This is the focus of Brubaker's work on the role of homeland in postcommunist ethnic relations.[8] Such a situation would not ordinarily fuel secessionist claims, though it could lead the government of the external homeland to intervene on behalf of the minority group. If there is a legitimate basis for claims of discrimination, the external homeland may put diplomatic, economic, or military pressure on the minority's state of residence to protect the minority from discrimination.

The second possible homeland is *internal*—a part of the state of residence. This perception of homeland is generally associated with a state that contains a sizable and concentrated ethnic minority. The minority considers a region to be its national homeland and desires political control over that territory. Such situations fuel secessionist drives and are at the heart of many ethnic conflicts around the world[9] because what is seen as a homeland by the minority is also often the perceived homeland of the majority group. This situation of overlapping homelands is common in the former Soviet Union, especially where regions within the existing successor states are named for a particular ethnic minority (for example, Chechnya within Russia and Abkhazia within Georgia).

The third type of homeland is best called the *mixed* (internal-external) homeland. In this situation, members of a minority in one state see the homeland as comprising both a part of the state of residence *and* an external region or state. Such views of homeland can result in irredentism, in which members of an ethnic minority support the secession of a region of their state of residence and its joining with a neighboring state.[10] An oft-mentioned example is Kazakhstan, where Russians consider both the northern part of the country and Russia as their homeland. In such

[7] Guntram H. Herb, "National Identity and Territory," in G. H Herb and David H. Kaplan, eds., *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 17. For another discussion of the interaction between territory and national identity, this one on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, see Nora Dudwick, "The Cultural Construction of Political Violence in Armenia and Azerbaijan," *Problems of Post-Communism* 42 (July–August 1995).

[8] Brubaker (fn. 2).

[9] See, for example, on secessionism in South Asia, Raju G. C. Thomas, "Competing Nationalisms: Secessionist Movements and the State," *Harvard International Review* 18 (Summer 1996).

[10] For analysis of causes of irredentism, see Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayers, "Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s," *Journal of Politics* 62 (November 2000).

situations, nationalist claims take the form of a desire to break part of the state of residence away and to join with the rest of the homeland group.[11]

The fourth homeland option is also internal but with different implications from those of the internal variant discussed above. Members of an ethnic minority may see their entire *state of residence* as their homeland. This possibility is rarely discussed in works on the intersection of minorities, identity, and territory.[12] Since it is assumed that to be a nation requires a homeland different from that which another nation can claim, it follows that by definition "national minorities" would not consider their state of current residence to be their homeland. Whereas *national* minorities (as the term is understood by scholars of nationalism) may not accept their state of residence as their homeland, *ethnic* minorities may.

An important assumption of Brubaker's framework, examined further below, is that ethnic minorities in the postcommunist states are also *national* minorities, with a particular national identity and attachment to an external homeland. In reality, however, large portions of these minorities may not consider themselves members of a national minority. Or if they do, they may nonetheless view their state of residence as their homeland, perhaps differentiating between the homeland where they now reside and their (external) national homeland, or between homeland (*rodina*) and fatherland (*otechestvo*)—the eternal or ancestral homeland.[13]

External National Homelands: Are They as Important as Commonly Thought?

Of the four homeland options for minorities mentioned above (external, internal, mixed, state of residence), Western researchers have tended to ignore state of residence as homeland, seizing instead upon the external homeland concept.[14] Many scholars of nationalism imply that when an external homeland is available to a minority, the minority will view its homeland in terms of either the external or the mixed op-

[11] As Table 1 indicates, however, there is almost no empirical support for the idea that ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan think of their homeland in this way.

[12] Kaiser, for example, discusses the way in which the migration of "nonindigenes to another nation's homeland has served to heighten the perception among indigenes that the nation and its primordial claim to homeland is under attack"; see Kaiser (fn. 6), 24. What he does not discuss in this section, however, is whether new residents may over time come to think of their new area as their homeland.

[13] This distinction can be found in a work by Dmytri Kornilov, the leader of the International Movement of Donbass (Ukraine), cited in Stephen Shulman, "Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 26 (December 1998), 621. However, most participants in focus groups in Ukraine did not make distinctions between "homeland" and "fatherland," noting that the two words employed were synonymous. Focus groups in Kazakhstan did not discuss the terminology for "homeland" at all.

[14] Smith and Wilson (fn. 3) emphasize both the external homeland idea of Brubaker and the idea that some in the ethnic minority may consider their homeland to be in their state of residence. They

TABLE 1
VIEWS OF HOMELAND BY RUSSIANS IN BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, AND UKRAINE[a]

	Belarus	*Kazakhstan*	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Ukraine*
Belarus	29.7	0.0	0.1	0.0
Belarus and City or Region	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Belarus City	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Belarus Region	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kazakhstan	0.3	52.5	3.2	0.0
Kazakhstan and City or Region	0.1	2.1	0.0	0.0
Kazakh City	0.1	3.8	0.3	0.0
Kazakh Region	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0
Kyrgyzstan	0.1	0.4	57.8	0.0
Kyrgyzstan and City or Region	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.0
Kyrgyz City	0.1	0.0	2.3	0.0
Kyrgyz Region	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ukraine	2.0	1.0	0.6	38.0
Ukrainian City	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
Ukrainian Region (except Crimea)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Crimea	0.3	0.0	0.0	2.7
Russia	21.3	18.1	18.0	16.4
Russia and City or Region	1.3	0.6	0.5	0.0
Russian City	5.4	1.3	0.8	0.0
Russian Region	7.7	2.4	1.4	2.0
USSR/Former USSR	6.5	3.9	4.1	14.3
Where things are good	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.0
The place where I was born	5.1	6.8	2.5	7.6
The place where I live	1.4	0.8	2.5	3.6
None	0.3	0.5	1.0	0.0
Other	3.3	3.1	2.1	3.0
Difficult to say	1.2	1.9	0.3	5.8
No answer	0.8	0.3	1.0	4.9
Base N	765	619	685	329

[a] The question for Ukraine is (P14, A15): "What do you consider to be your homeland?" For Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (B9NUM), it is: "Tell me, please, what do you consider to be

Several of these findings are quite surprising. First, few Russians in these states consider a *part* of their state of residence to be their homeland. This was unexpected in the cases of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, states where scholars have emphasized the sharp ethnoregional divides (northern Kazakhstan versus the rest of the country, and the east of Ukraine and Crimea versus the rest of Ukraine). Second, surprisingly few Russians living outside the Russian Federation consider Russia to be their homeland: *fewer than one-quarter of the ethnic Russian respondents in the four states offered Russia as their homeland*. Third, few designate a part of the current state of residence and Russia in combination as a homeland; hence, the internal-external variant is simply not a consideration of the Russians in these four countries. Instead, a substantial proportion of these Russians identify their current states of residence as their homeland. These include majorities in both Kazakhstan (52.5 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (57.8 percent).[20] And although the percentages in Belarus and Ukraine are smaller (29.7 percent and 38.0 percent, respectively), they are still much larger than any other response given by Russians residing in these two states.

Many of the responses did not refer simply to Russia as a whole or to the state of residence as a whole. In some cases, Russia or the country of residence was combined with a city or region, a finding consistent with a multilevel homeland idea. In other cases, however, a nonexistent country (the USSR) was still seen as the respondent's homeland.[21] And for some of the respondents, no specific territorial unit was mentioned at all; rather, statements were given such as "where I was born," "where I live," and "where I am happy."[22] Thus, many respondents perceived the concept of "homeland" in ways that do not fit neatly into one of the categories outlined above. It would seem therefore that this concept is

[20] It is surprising, given the tendency of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to show greater attachment to Russia in other ways, that so many in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan chose to identify their state of residence as their homeland.

[21] This idea of the USSR remaining as a homeland after its collapse is pointed to in the literature on post-Soviet ethnic relations; see, for example, Smith and Wilson (fn. 3).

[22]

more problematic for the ethnic minorities themselves than it has been for many scholars and politicians.

Ethnic Minorities and Homeland: Do "National Minorities"

More likely, then, the term "national minority" does not mean to ethnic Russians what it means to some scholars. Seemingly recognizing the distinction between ethnic minority and national minority, Davis and Sabol discuss the Russians in Kazakhstan as an ethnic minority but one that is well "rooted" in the country[24]—the Russians in Kazakhstan accept the state as their homeland, have a certain degree of loyalty to it, and do not wish to emigrate to Russia.[25] While this is true of many of the Russians in Kazakhstan, our data indicate that it is not true of all, and it is of course not true of the many hundreds of thousands of Russians who left Kazakhstan for Russia over the last decade.[26]

In Ukraine and especially in Belarus most ethnic Russians are not made aware of their distinctive "Russianness" on a daily basis. The cultural distance between Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians is small. In contrast, in the Central Asian states Russians have a sense of otherness that reinforces a feeling of belonging to a national minority. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, they *feel* Russian.[27] Some of this is due to

[24] Sue Davis and Steven O. Sabol, "The Importance of Being Ethnic: Minorities in Post-Soviet States—The Case of Russians in Kazakhstan," *Nationalities Papers* 26 (September 1998).

[25] Ibid., 475.

[26] See Melvin (fn. 1); Galina Vitkovskaya, "Potential Migration of Russian-Speaking Populations from Central Asia to Russia," in George J. Demko, Grigory Ioffe, and Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, eds., *Population under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).

[27] Shulman (fn. 13) claims that such a heightened sense of identity would waken the "internal national pull" of the minority in question (in this case the Russians) and lead the minority to reach out to the external homeland. While the data do show a greater tendency for Russians in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to reach out to Russia, they also show that for most Russians living there these Central Asian states are their homelands. Thus, while a greater ethnic distance between the majority and minority (and policies by the state that emphasize ethnicity) may make members of the minority more likely to look for help from coethnics in a neighboring state, it does not seem to be enough to overcome the sense of homeland. Indeed, as we show below, country of birth seems to be the decisive factor in

the large ethnic difference between Russians and titular Central Asian nationalities.[28] In Kazakhstan it is also probably reinforced by the nativization policies that President Nursultan Nazarbaev has, at times, pursued.[29]

Another possible explanation of the difference between the way that Russians in Central Asia and Ukraine and Belarus feel about themselves has to do with the groups' sense of historical ties to their state of residence. Because Russians have lived in Ukraine for centuries, for example, there is a sense of "legitimate" belonging.[30] In presenting this argument, Shulman claims that Russians in Ukraine do not even like to think of themselves as an ethnic minority, because the term implies a limited historical link to the territory.[31]

Which Russians Choose an External Homeland and Which Choose an Internal Homeland?

In none of the four countries under consideration here does the empirical evidence support key assumptions about the attachment to homeland posited in most of the Western social science literature. Identifying oneself as Russian by "nationality" (*natsional'nost'*) does not represent a declaration of affiliation or a sense of shared historical fate with Russia. Still, the Russian populations in these countries are not homogeneous in their choice of homeland. We now turn to the question why some choose an internal homeland and some an external one and then explore several factors that could determine that choice.[32]

If the designation of homeland by Russians in our surveys is not determined by self-identified nationality or ethnicity itself but instead more often corresponds to the country of residence at the time of the survey, an important question is whether the responses reflect deep emotive ties to the current country or whether they reflect a pragmatic

[28] In the cases of Belarus and Ukraine such a large ethnic difference does not exist between the titular populations and the ethnic Russians. As Szporluk puts it, "Ukrainians and Belarusans are commonly perceived in Russia as being Russian"; Roman Szporluk, "Introduction: Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space," in Szporluk, ed., *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y.; M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 9.

[29] See Melvin (fn.1), 109–10; Davis and Sabol (fn. 24), 481–82.

[30] Shulman (fn. 13), 621.

[31] Ibid.

[32] We recognize of course that many Russians emigrated from Central Asia in the 1990s and thereby "voted with their feet." Yet these emigration decisions may well be based largely on pragmatic grounds—a sense of both the economic and social situations in Central Asia compared with Russia or other alternative locations. They do not necessarily reflect a "call to the homeland." Given that we conducted our surveys during a period of continued heavy emigration of Russians from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, our finding that only a minority of Russians defined Russia as their homeland is especially instructive.

or instrumental judgment. In general, because of its symbolic importance, homeland should not be expected to be mainly determined by instrumental factors but rather should be expected to reflect the degree to which an individual is rooted in a given country, territory, or society. We conducted a multivariate probit analysis to assess the determinants of homeland.

We reclassified responses from Table 1 into two categories. Respondents who stated that their homeland was the current state of residence or a portion thereof were coded as choosing an internal homeland. In addition, respondents who said that their homeland was "where I was born" were coded as identifying an internal homeland if they were born in the current country of residence.[33] Otherwise, respondents were coded as selecting an external homeland. Those who identified a state (or portion of a state) that was not the current state of residence were coded as selecting an external homeland.[34] The dependent variable was coded 1 if the respondent selected an external homeland and 0 if the respondent selected an internal homeland.

Independent Variables

Our first independent variable is *country of birth*. Whether people emigrated freely or were uprooted forcibly from their native country, they could still be expected in most cases to maintain emotional ties to it. If, however, they currently reside in their native country, they can be expected in most cases to identify their country of residence as their homeland. We therefore expect to find a close correspondence between self-designated homeland and the respondents' country of birth.

At the same time, a myth emphasizing "return" to the homeland can be nurtured or maintained in many circumstances by refugees and emigrants, even among people who have never lived in the ancestral home. This is typical of diasporic populations such as Jews and Armenians but also of many Ukrainians, Balts, and other ethnic groups that lived abroad during the period of Soviet "occupation" of their homeland. Thus, myths about Russia as the true home or mother country can be expected to appeal to a certain percentage of Russians and draw them to identify Russia as their homeland even if they were not born there.

Responses by ethnic Russians in focus groups held in Kazakhstan and Ukraine reinforce the primacy of nativity in perceptions of home-

[33] Respondents who indicated that their homeland was "where I live" were also classified as selecting an internal homeland.

[34] This includes respondents who selected "USSR," "CIS," "Former Soviet Union," and "Outside FSU."

had been born in their current country of residence had lived there 100 percent of their lifetimes, but some had lived there for fewer years.

Age cohort is another factor to consider. At first glance, we might expect younger Russians in the near abroad to name their country of residence as their homeland because they are more adaptable and accommodating to circumstance. However, such a finding would run counter to evidence in our own data that younger persons are more likely to have emigrated previously from the near abroad to Russia and hence that they are more likely to respond to the changing political and economic environment by exiting the scene.[36] We examine the relation between age and choice of homeland in our analysis using five age cohorts: 18–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60–69; respondents age 70 and above are the comparison category.

We also include a number of control variables that could affect the identification of homeland. These include education, urban residence, and gender. Education is represented by a single dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the respondent has some higher education; otherwise 0. Urban dwellers are coded 1; rural residents are coded 0; gender is coded 1 for males, 0 for females.

Results and Discussion

Table 3 shows the results of a multivariate probit analysis. Our model assesses individual choice well, correctly predicting outcomes in 81 percent of the cases.[37] Individual coefficients also conform with our expectations.

Place of birth is a powerful explanatory factor. Respondents born in Russia are more likely to select an external homeland than those born

TABLE 3

PROBIT R

homeland than those born outside Russia. Respondents born in the country of residence are 40 percent more likely to identify that country as their homeland. The coefficient is significant and negative; the marginal effect is –0.40. Thus, nativity is a strong predictor of what people designate as their homeland.

The proportion of the lifetime spent in the current state also strongly

influences the designation of homeland. The larger a proportion of their life the people have lived in their current state of residence, the

as their homeland, while the majority designate their country of birth as their homeland. Hence some other factors are at work. While it is likely that an important part of the story is length of residence, it is especially interesting to determine whether the conception of a homeland is related to other attitudes. One possibility is that an individual's judgments about political community, system, or politics of the government of the country of residence are related to homeland choice.

We first analyze the relationship between nativity, homeland identification, and the level of national pride. The national pride measure is a mean score based on whether the respondents asserted that they were "proud" of various achievements of the country of residence in science, the economy, sports, and culture. If an individual is proud of a given achievement, he or she receives a score of 100; if not proud, the score is 0 on that item. The mean score based on the ratings of each item also ranges from 0 to 100.

In Figure 1 respondents in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are classified according to both their country of birth and their designated homeland. Respondents' designation of their country of residence as their homeland is correlated with their level of national pride. Those who claim a country as homeland tend to have higher levels of national pride—both among persons who were born in the country and among those who were not.

In all three countries the respondents who manifest the highest levels of national pride are those Russians who were *not* born in the current country of residence but who designate this country as their homeland. At first it may seem odd that Russians who are nonnatives manifest higher pride in country than Russians who were born in the country of residence. However, we would conjecture that since Russians who were born outside the country are precisely the ones who are most likely to have a choice of homelands, those who choose their country of residence do not do so randomly but because they have a psychological attachment to the country—as reflected in our measure of national pride. Although Russians who are born outside the country of residence and who claim that country as homeland are in the minority, their choice of homeland appears to be deliberate and consistent with at least one key indicator of their attachment to their country of residence.

We found analogous results when we examined the degree of confidence in major political institutions.[39] Although confidence in such institutions is low, again those Russians who identified their homeland as

[39] We assessed confidence in parliament, the courts, government, and the presidency. Results are available upon request from Lowell Barrington (lowell.barrington@marquette.edu).



FIGURE 1
PRIDE IN COUNTRY, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND SELF-IDENTIFIED "HOMELAND"[a]

[a]Data are based on answers to the question: "Are you proud of [country name's] achievements in sports, science, culture and arts, economics?" A "yes" to each was scored as 100; a "no" as 0. Scores in the chart represent the mean across the four items. Thus, for example, among all Russians in Belarus on average 75 percent were "proud" of all four areas of achievement.

the country of residence expressed greater confidence in political institutions. Those who were born outside of the country of residence but who designated this country as their homeland were the most supportive of political institutions. Such findings are consistent with the claims of Easton that an overarching sense of "political community" is crucial to the support for and the stability of the political system.[40]

[40] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics* 9 (April 1957).

Further confirmation comes from an analysis of emigration intentions. The respondents were asked: *What is your attitude toward the idea of leaving [Belarus]? Would you prefer to stay and live here, would you like to leave, or have you not decided what to do?*[41] Although the percentage distributions should not be interpreted as literally representing how many Russians plan to stay or to leave, they are probably indicative of a general attitude toward the country (and toward possible alternative places to live). In Figure 2 we see that a much larger proportion of the Russians in Belarus (94 percent) than in Kazakhstan (62 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (75 percent) intend to remain in their country of residence.[42] Moreover, those who identify the country as their homeland are more likely to plan to remain in the country; indeed, whether one identifies the country of residence as homeland makes more of a difference than nativity in differentiating between those who intend to remain in the country and those who intend to leave. Lastly, *the Russians who most often say they intend to remain in the country are those who were born outside the country but designate the country of residence as their homeland.* This is the very pattern of relationships that we observed in the analysis of national pride.

The association between self-identified homeland and attitudes toward the country of residence (national pride, confidence in political institutions, intention to remain in the country) indicates the meaningfulness of the choice that the respondents are exercising when they designate a particular country as homeland. It is especially those Russians who were born in Russia but who did *not* designate Russia as homeland for whom the choice of homeland in the survey is a conscious one. These Russians in the near abroad manifest the greatest national pride, support for political institutions, and commitment to remaining in their country of residence. These Russians are probably least susceptible to mobilization to the Russian nationalist cause by political entrepreneurs in Russia or abroad.

This conclusion is strengthened by the evidence in Figure 3, which shows that although those Russians in the four countries who regard Russia as their homeland expressed a more positive view of efforts of mobilization than Russians who regarded their country of residence as their homeland, only small percentages of either group of Russians viewed the actions of Russian politicians as having a positive effect on the status of Russian speakers.

Similarly, Figure 4 reveals that although those who regarded Russia



FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE WHO INTEND TO REMAIN IN COUNTRY, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND SELF-IDENTIFIED "HOMELAND"[a]

[a]Percentage who answer "Stay and live" or "Undecided" to question: "What is your attitude toward the idea of leaving [country]? Would you like to stay and live here, would you like to leave, or have you not decided where to live?"

as their homeland were more likely to say that Russian authorities should defend the interests of Russian speakers than those who considered their country of residence to be their homeland, neither group of Russians in the near abroad looked to Russian authorities to defend their interests. Instead, they viewed their own government as having the main responsibility for defending the interests of Russian speakers in their country of residence.[43]

[43] We obtain similar results to those in Figures 3 and 4 if we use country of birth in place of homeland. However, as noted earlier, the two variables are highly correlated with one another, and so we use "homeland" here because we have information on this variable from all four countries in our study.



FIGURE 3
PERCENTAGE WHO VIEW PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW AS HAVING A POSITIVE EFFECT ON RUSSIAN SPEAKERS[a]

[a]The question posed was: "Many politicians in Moscow demand the defense of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Tell me, how have these declarations affected the status of Russian speakers in [Belarus]—have they improved the status of the Russian-speaking population, worsened its status, or have they not affected its status?" Based on respondents who said pressure from Moscow had either "positive," "negative," or "no effect. "Hard to say" and "NA" are treated as missing values.

Thus, while emigration has been an option selected by many Russians, especially in regions and periods of civil conflict in the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, and Central Asia, those who have remained in the near abroad do not necessarily look to Russia for solutions to local problems. Furthermore, the potential mobilizability of segments of the Russian population outside Russia by activists or politicians in Russia is likely to depend not only on the general political and economic climate in the country of residence but also on individual characteristics of the Russians abroad.

CONCLUSION

Our evidence from surveys and focus groups conducted in several post-Soviet countries is damaging to theories that assume that Russians in neighboring countries feel a strong identification with Russia as a homeland. To be sure, from 1992 through 1997, an estimated 5.1 mil-



FIGURE 4
PERCENTAGE WHO SAY THAT RUSSIAN FEDERATION AUTHORITIES SHOULD DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF RUSSIAN SPEAKERS[a]

[a] The question posed was: "Who, in your opinion, primarily ought to defend the position of Russians and other Russian speakers in [Belarus]? [Belarusan] authorities, Russian authorities, international organizations, social and political organizations of Russian speakers, the Russian-speaking population of [Belarus], or the entire population of [Belarus]?" "Hard to say" and "NA" are treated as missing values.

lion people, most of them ethnic Russians, migrated from the near abroad to the Russian Federation.[44] In recent years Central Asia has been the largest contributor to the flow of migrants.[45] For this reason, our surveys are subject to a selection effect: Russians who remained in the neighboring countries seven years after the end of the Soviet Union are more likely to be committed to the state of residence than those who left for Russia.

[44] This is the number of registered forced migrants and refugees, according to the head of the Federal Migration Service in Russia. See Eurasia Foundation, *Tatiana Regent: Migration from Former Soviet Republics to Russia Has Reduced* (www.eurasia.org.ru/english/july/Eng0008.html).

[45] Net outmigration from Central Asia and Transcaucasia to Russia is not, however, a post-Soviet invention. It had been going on for at least two decades prior to the demise of the Soviet Union. See Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Demographic Sources of the Changing Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Union," *Population and Development Review* 15 (December 1989); idem, "Population Redistribution and the Ethnic Balance in Transcaucasia," in Ronald G. Suny, ed., *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). But without question emigration accelerated rapidly in the 1990s. For recent analysis of this trend in Kazakhstan, see Richard H. Rowland, "Regional Population Change in Kazakstan during the 1990s and the Impact of Nationality Population Patterns: Results from the Recent Census of Kazakhstan," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 42 (December 2001).

Yet well after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some observers suggested that Russian ethnonationalism—engaging the Russian state and